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Abstract: In this paper, we present a comparative analysis of benign and malicious Android applications, based on static
features. In particular, we focus our attention on the permissions requested by an application. We consider both
binary classification of malware versus benign, as well as the multiclass problem, where we classify malware
samples into their respective families. Our experiments are based on substantial malware datasets and we
employ a wide variety of machine learning techniques, including decision trees and random forests, support
vector machines, logistic model trees, AdaBoost, and artificial neural networks. We find that permissions are
a strong feature and that by careful feature engineering, we can significantly reduce the number of features
needed for highly accurate detection and classification.
1 INTRODUCTION
As of 2017, the Android OS accounted for more
than 85% of the mobile OS market, and there were
more than 82 billion application (app) downloads
from the Google Play store during 2017 (Android
Statistics, 2017). Predictably, the number of Android
malware apps is also large—it is estimated that there
were 3.5 million such apps in 2017, representing more
than a six-fold increase since 2015 (Malware Fore-
cast, 2017). It follows that effective malware detec-
tion on Android devices is of critical importance.
Features that can be collected without execut-
ing the code are said to be “static,” while features
that require execution (or emulation) are considered
“dynamic.” Dynamic analysis is generally more in-
formative and dynamic features are typically more
difficult for malware writers to defeat via obfusca-
tion (Damodaran et al., 2017). However, extracting
dynamic features is likely to be far more costly and
time consuming, as compared to most static features.
Since efficiency is important on a mobile platform, in
this paper, we focus on static analysis. Specifically,
we consider the related problems of Android mal-
ware detection and classification based on requested
permissions—features that are easily obtained from
the manifest file. We analyze this feature over sub-
stantial malware datasets, and we consider the prob-
lem of feature reduction in some detail. Perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, we find that a small subset
of these features suffices. This is significant, since
malware detection on a mobile device must be fast,
efficient, and effective—the approach consider here
meets all three of these criteria.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss relevant back-
ground topics, including related work. In Section 3
we discuss our experimental design and give our ex-
perimental results. We also provide some discussion
of our results. Finally, in Section 4 we conclude the
paper and give some suggestions for future work.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we first briefly discuss relevant back-
ground topics. First, we outline each of the machine
learning techniques considered in this paper. Then we
discuss some examples of relevant related work.
2.1 Machine Learning Techniques
In this research, we employ a wide variety of machine
learning techniques. A detailed discussion of these
techniques is well beyond the scope of this paper—
here, we simply provide a high-level overview.
Random forest can be viewed as a generalization of
the simple concept of a decision tree (Breiman
and Cutler, 2001). While decision trees are in-
deed simple, they tend to grossly overfit the train-
ing data, and hence provide little, if any, actual
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“learning.” A random forest overcomes the weak-
ness of decision trees by the use of bagging (i.e.,
bootstrap aggregation), that is, multiple decision
trees are trained using subsets of the data and fea-
tures. Then, a voting procedure based on these
multiple decision trees is typically used to deter-
mine the random forest classification. In each of
our random forest experiments, we use 100 trees.
Random trees are a subclass of random forests,
where the bagging only involves the classifiers,
not the data. We would generally expect better re-
sults from a random forest, but random trees will
be more efficient. Our random trees results are
based on a single tree.
J48 is a specific implementation of the C4.5 algo-
rithm (Quinlan, 2018), which is a popular method
for constructing decision trees. We would gener-
ally expect random trees to outperform decision
trees while, as mentioned above, random forests
should typically outperform random trees. How-
ever, decision trees are more efficient than ran-
dom trees, which are more efficient than random
forests. Thus, it is worth experimenting with all
three of these tree-based algorithms to determine
the proper tradeoff between efficiency and accu-
racy.
Artificial neural network (ANN) represents a large
class of machine learning techniques that at-
tempt to (loosely) model the behavior of neurons
and trained using backpropagation (Stamp, 2018).
While ANNs are not a new concept, having first
been proposed in the 1940s, they have found
renewed interest in recent years as computing
power has become sufficient to effectively deal
with “deep” neural network, i.e., networks that in-
clude many hidden layers. Such deep networks
have pushed machine learning to new heights. For
our ANN experiments, we use two hidden layers,
with 10 neurons per layer, the rectified linear unit
(ReLU) for the activation functions on the hidden
layers, and a sigmoid function for the output layer.
Training consists of 100 epochs, with the learning
rate set at α= 0.001.
Support vector machine (SVM) is a popular and ef-
fective machine learning technique. According
to (Bennett and Campbell, 2000), “SVMs are a
rare example of a methodology where geometric
intuition, elegant mathematics, theoretical guar-
antees, and practical algorithms meet.” When
training an SVM, we attempt to find a separat-
ing hyperplane that maximizes the “margin,” i.e.,
the minimum distance between the classes in the
training set. A particularly nice feature of SVMs
is that we can map the input data to a higher di-
mensional feature space, where we are much more
likely to be able to separate the data. And, thanks
to the so-called “kernel trick,” this mapping en-
tails virtually no computational penalty. All of
our SVM experiments are based on a linear ker-
nel function with ε= 0.001.
Logistic model tree (LMT) can be viewed as a hy-
brid of decision trees and logistic regression.
That is, in an LMT, decision trees are con-
structed, with logistic regression functions at the
leaf nodes (Landwehr et al., 2005). In our LMT
experiments, we use a minimum of 15 instances,
where each node is considered for splitting.
Boosting is a general—and generally fairly
straightforward—approach to building a strong
model from a collection of (weak) models. In
this paper, we employ the well-known adaptive
boosting algorithm, AdaBoost (Stamp, 2017a).
Multinomial naı¨ve Bayes is a form of naı¨ve Bayes
where the underlying probability is assumed to
satisfy a multinomial distribution. In naı¨ve Bayes,
we make a strong independence assumption,
which results in an extremely simply “model” that
often performs surprisingly well in practice.
The static analysis can be done using the Java
Bytecode extracted after disassembling the apk file.
Also we can extract permissions from the manifest
file. In this paper, we take advantage of the static
analysis using permissions of applications and use
them for detecting malware and also classify differ-
ent malware families. The effectiveness of these tech-
niques is analyzed using multiple machine learning
algorithms.
2.2 Selected Related Work
The paper (Feng et al., 2014) discusses a tool the au-
thors refer to as Appopscopy, which implements a
semantic language-based Android signature detection
strategy. In their research, general signatures are cre-
ated for each malware family. Signature matching is
achieved using inter-component call graphs based on
control flow properties and the results are enhanced
using static taint analysis. The authors report an ac-
curacy of 90% on a malware dataset containing 1027
samples, with the accuracy for individual families
ranging from a high of 100% to a low of 38%.
In the research (Fuchs et al., 2009), the authors
analyze a tool called SCanDroid that they have devel-
oped. This tool extracts features based on data flow.
The work in (Abah et al., 2015) relies on k-nearest
neighbor classification based on a variety of features,
include incoming and outgoing SMS and calls, de-
vice status, running processes, and more. This work
claims that an accuracy of 93.75% is achieved. In the
research (Aung and Zaw, 2013), the authors propose
a framework and test a variety of machine learning al-
gorithms to analyze features based on Android events
and permissions. Experimental results from a dataset
of some 500 malware samples yield a maximum ac-
curacy of 91.75% for a random forest model.
In the paper (Afonso et al., 2015), the authors pro-
pose a dynamic analysis technique that is focused on
the frequency of system and API calls. A large num-
ber of machine learning techniques are tested on a
dataset of about 4500 malicious Android apps. The
authors give accuracy results ranging from 74.53%
to 95.96%. Again, a random forest algorithm achieves
the best results.
The research (Enck et al., 2010) discusses a
dynamic analysis tool, TaintDroid. This sophisti-
cated system analyzes network traffic to search for
anomalous behavior—the research is in a similar vein
as (Feng et al., 2014), but with the emphasis on ef-
ficiency. Another Android system call analysis tech-
nique is considered in (Dimjas˘evic´ et al., 2015).
Our work is perhaps most closely related to the
research in (Sugunan et al., 2018) and (Kapratwar
et al., 2017) which, in turn, built on the groundbreak-
ing work of (Arp et al., 2014) and (Schmeelk et al.,
2015), as well as that in (Zhou et al., 2012). In (Arp
et al., 2014), for example, an accuracy of 93.9% is at-
tained over a dataset of 5600 malicious Android apps.
The paper (Kapratwar et al., 2017) considers static
and dynamic analysis of Android malware based on
permissions and API calls, respectively. A robustness
analysis is presented, and it is suggested that malware
writers can most likely defeat detectors that rely on
permissions. We provide a more careful analysis in
this paper and find that such is not the case.
3 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we first discuss our datasets and fea-
ture extraction process. Then we turn our attention
to feature engineering, that is, we determine the most
significant features for use in our experiments. We
also discuss our experimental design before present-
ing results from a wide variety experiments.
3.1 Datasets
We use the Android Malware Genome Project (Zhou
and Jiang, 2012) dataset. This data consists mainly of
apk files obtained from various malware forums and
Android markets—these samples have been widely
used in previous research. Labels are included, which
specify the family to which each sample belongs.
Thus, the data can be used for both binary classifica-
tion (i.e., malware versus benign) and the multiclass
(i.e., family) classification problems.
For our benign dataset, we crawled the PlayDrone
project (PlayDrone, 2018), as found on the Internet
Archive (Internet Archive, 2018). The resulting apk
files might include malicious samples. Therefore, we
used Androguard (Androguard, 2018) to filter bro-
ken and potentially malicious apk files. Table 1 gives
the number of malware and benign samples that we
obtained. These samples will be used in our binary
classification (malware versus benign) and multiclass
(malware family) experiments discussed below.
Table 1: Datasets
Samples
Experiment Type Number
Detection Malware 989Benign 2657
Classification Malware 1260
3.2 Feature Extraction
To extract static features, we need to reverse en-
gineer the apk files. We again use Androguard
this reverse engineering task. The manifest file,
AndroidManifest.xml, contains numerous potential
static features; here we focus on the permissions re-
quested by an application.
From the superset of malware and benign samples,
we find that there are 230 distinct permissions. Thus,
for each apk, a feature vector is generated based on
these permissions. The feature vector is simply a bi-
nary sequence of length 230, which indicates whether
each of the corresponding permissions is requested by
the application or not. Along with each feature vec-
tor, we have a denoting label of +1 or −1, indicat-
ing whether the sample is malware or benign, respec-
tively. The overall architecture, in the case of binary
classification, is given in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Binary classification architecture
For the multiclass (family) classification problem,
essentially the same process is followed as for the bi-
nary classification case. However, we only examine
malware samples, and over our malware dataset, we
find that only 118 distinct permissions occur. Thus,
the feature vectors for the multiclass problem are of
length 118.
3.3 Feature Engineering
It is likely that many of the features under consider-
ation (i.e., permissions) provide little or no discrimi-
nating information, with respect to the malware ver-
sus benign or the malware classification problem. It
is useful to remove such features from the analysis,
as they essentially act as noise, and can therefore
cause us to obtain worse results than we would with
a smaller, but more informative, feature set. It is also
useful to remove extraneous features so that scoring
is as efficient as possible. Consequently, our immedi-
ate goal is to determine features that are of no value
for our analysis, and remove them from subsequent
consideration.
There are several techniques for determining fea-
ture significance. Here we consider two distinct ap-
proaches to this problem. First, we use information
gain to reduce the feature set. Second, we use recur-
sive feature elimination (RFE) based on a linear SVM.
Information gain is easily computed and gives us a
straightforward means of eliminating features. RFE
is somewhat more involved, but accounts for feature
interactions in a way that a simple information gain
calculation cannot.
The information gain (IG) provided by a feature
is defined as the expected reduction in entropy when
we branch on that feature. In the context of a decision
tree, information gain can be computed as the entropy
of the parent node minus the average weighted en-
tropy of its child nodes. We measure the information
gain for each feature, and select features in a greedy
manner. In a decision tree, this has the desirable effect
of putting decisions based on the most informative
features closest to the root. This is desirable, since
the entropy is reduced as rapidly as possible, and en-
ables the tree to be simplified by trimming features
that provide little or no gain.
For our purposes, we simply use the information
gain to reduce the number of features, then apply var-
ious machine learning techniques to this reduced fea-
ture set. Based on the information gain, we selected
the 74 highest ranked features—the top 10 of these
features are given in Table 2. Features that ranked
outside the top 74 provided no improvement in our
results.
Table 2: Permissions ranked by IG
Score Permission
0.30682 READ SMS
0.28129 WRITE SMS
0.17211 READ PHONE STATE
0.15197 RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED
0.14087 WRITE APN SETTINGS
0.13045 RECEIVE SMS
0.10695 SEND SMS
0.10614 CHANGE WIFI STATE
0.10042 INSTALL PACKAGES
0.10019 RESTART PACKAGES
As mentioned above, we also reduce the feature
set using RFE based on a linear SVM. In a linear
SVM, a weight is assigned to each feature, with the
weight signifying the importance that the SVM at-
taches to the feature. For our RFE approach, we elim-
inate the feature with the lowest linear SVM weight,
then train a new SVM on this reduced (by one) fea-
ture set. Then we again eliminate the feature with the
lowest SVM weight, train a new linear SVM on this
reduced feature set. This process is continued until
a single feature remains, and in this way, we obtain
a complete ranking of the features. The potential ad-
vantage of this RFE technique is that it accounts for
feature interactions among all of the reduced feature
sets. The top 10 features obtained using RFE based
on a linear SVM are listed in Table 3.
Table 3: Permissions ranked by RFE using a linear SVM
Rank Permission
1 WRITE APN SETTINGS
2 WRITE CALENDAR
3 WRITE CALL LOG
4 WRITE CONTACTS
5 WRITE INTERNAL STORAGE
6 WRITE OWNER DATA
7 WRITE SECURE SETTINGS
8 WRITE SETTINGS
9 WRITE SMS
10 WRITE SYNC SETTINGS
In Figure 2, we give the cross validation score of
the linear SVM as a function of the number of fea-
tures, as obtained by RFE. We see that the top 82
features gives us an optimal result—additional fea-
tures beyond this number provide no benefit. Con-
sequently, we use the 82 top RFE features in our ex-
periments below.
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Figure 2: Recursive feature elimination (RFE)
3.4 Binary Classification
In this section, we discuss our binary classification
experiments. We consider both the IG features and
the RFE features. We test a wide variety of machine
learning algorithms and provide various statistics.
First, we consider the IG features, as discussed
in Section 3.3, above. Bar graphs of training and
testing precision for each of the techniques discussed
in Section 2.1 are plotted in Figure 3. For this ex-
periment the number of samples in the malware and
benign datasets are listed in Table 1, where we see
that there is total of 3647 samples. Here, and in all
subsequent experiments, we use 5-fold cross valida-
tion. Cross validation serves to maximize the num-
ber of test cases, while simultaneously minimizing
the effect of any bias that might exist in the training
data (Stamp, 2017b).
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Figure 3: Machine learning comparison based on precision
(IG features)
Given a scatterplot of experimental results, an
ROC curve is obtained by graphing the true positive
rate versus the false positive rate, as the threshold
varies through the range of values. The area under
the ROC curve (AUC) is between 0 and 1, inclusive,
and can be interpreted as the probability that a ran-
domly selected positive instance scores higher than a
randomly selected negative instance (Stamp, 2017b).
In Figure 4, we give the AUC statistic for the same set
of IG feature experiments that we ahve summarized in
Figure 3.
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Figure 4: Machine learning comparison based on AUC (IG
features)
We repeated the experiments above using the 82
RFE features, rather than the 74 IG features. The pre-
cision results for these machine learning experiments
are given in Figure 5, while the corresponding AUC
results are summarized in Figure 6.
The performance between the various machine
learning algorithms varies significantly, with multi-
nomial naı¨ve Bayes consistently the worst, while ran-
dom forests and ANNs perform the best. The IG and
RFE cases are fairly similar, although ANNs are bet-
ter on the RFE features, with random forest are better
on the IG features.
3.5 ANN Experiments
Since ANNs performed well in the experiments
above, we have conducted additional experiments to
determine the effect of an imbalanced dataset and to
test the effect of small training sets. For these ex-
periments, we use the IG features and the same bi-
nary classification dataset as above, with the skewed
training sets selected at random. Again, we use 5-fold
cross validation.
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Figure 5: Machine learning comparison based on precision
(RFE features)
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Figure 6: Machine learning comparison based on AUC
(RFE features)
We experiment with three different ratios between
the sizes of the malware and benign sets, namely, a
ratio of 1:3 (i.e., three times as many benign samples
as malware samples), as well as ratios of 1:6 and 1:12.
For the 1:3 ratio, we have sufficient data to consider
following four different cases:
• 100 malware and 300 benign
• 200 malware and 600 benign
• 400 malware and 1200 benign
• 800 malware and 2400 benign
For a 1:6 ratio, we have enough samples so that we
can consider the following three cases:
• 100 malware and 600 benign
• 200 malware and 1200 benign
• 400 malware and 2400 benign
Finally, for the 1:12 ratio, we have sufficient data for
the following two cases:
• 100 malware and 1200 benign
• 200 malware and 2400 benign
The testing precision and AUC results for the 1:3,
1:6, and 1:12 training cases are given in Figures 7 (a)
through (c), respectively. We see that, for example,
with only 100 malware and 300 benign samples, we
obtain a testing precision in excess of 0.98 and an
AUC of approximately 0.96. Overall, these results
show that the ANN performs extremely well, even
with a small and highly skewed training set. This is
significant, since we would like to train a model as
soon as possible (in which case the training set may be
small), and the samples are likely to be highly skewed
towards the benign case.
3.6 Robustness Experiments
As an attack on permissions-based detection, a mal-
ware writer might simply request more of the per-
missions that are typical of benign samples, while
still requesting permissions that are necessary for the
malware to function. In this way, the permissions
statistics of the malware samples would be somewhat
closer to those of the benign samples. Analogous
attacks have proven successful against malware de-
tection based on opcode sequences (Lin and Stamp,
2011).
To simulate such an attack, for each value of N =
0,1,2, . . . ,20, we include the top N benign permis-
sions in each malware sample. For each of these
cases, we have performed an ANN experiment, simi-
lar to those in Section 3.5, above. The precision and
AUC results are given in the form of line graphs in
Figure 8. Note that the N = 0 case corresponds to no
modification to the malware permissions.
The results in Figure 8 show that there is a de-
crease in the effectiveness of the ANN when a small
number of the most popular benign permissions are
requested. However, when more than N = 5 permis-
sions are included, the success of the ANN recovers,
and actually improves on the unmodified N = 0 case.
These results show that a straightforward attack on the
permissions can have a modest effect, but we also see
that permissions are a surprisingly robust feature.
3.7 Multiclass Classification
For the multiclass experiments in this section, we
again use permission-based features. The metrics
considered here are precision and the AUC. As above,
we use five-fold cross validation in each experiment.
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Figure 8: Robustness tests based on ANN
For these experiments, we use all malware sam-
ples in our dataset that include a family label. The
distribution of these malware families is given in
Figure 9. Note that we have 49 malware families and
a total 1260 malware samples.
Bar graphs of precision and AUC results for mul-
tiple machine learning techniques are give in Fig-
ures 10 (a) and (b), respectively. We observe that a
random forest performs best in these multiclass exper-
iments, attaining a testing accuracy in excess of 0.95.
This is an impressive number, given that we have such
a large number of classes. Other machine learning
techniques that perform well on this challenging mul-
ticlass problem include LMT and AdaBoost.
While there are 49 malware families in our
dataset, from Figure 9 we see that a few large fam-
ilies dominate, while many of the “families” contain
only 1 or 2 samples, and most are in the single dig-
its. To determine the effect of this imbalance on our
results, we also performed multiclass experiments on
balanced datasets. In Figures 11 (a) through (c) we
give results for balanced sets with 30, 40, and 50
samples per family, respectively. For example, 11 of
the 49 malware families in our dataset have at least 30
samples. From each of these 11 families, we ran-
domly select 30 samples, then perform multiclass ex-
periments and we give the precision and AUC results
in Figure 11 (a).
Overall the results in Figure 11 clearly demon-
strate that our strong multiclass results are not an ar-
tifact of the imbalance in our dataset. In fact, with
a sufficient number of samples per family, we ob-
tain better results on the balanced dataset than on the
highly imbalanced dataset. Of course, the number of
families is much smaller in the balanced case, but we
do have a significant number of families in all of these
experiments.
Since a random forest performs best in the mal-
ware classification problem, we give the confusion
matrices for this case in Figure 12. This confusion
matrix provides a more fine-grained view of the re-
sults reported above. We observe that the misclassifi-
cation are sporadic, in the sense that all of cases where
a significant percentage of samples are misclassified
occur in small families, with the number of samples
being in the single digits.
4 CONCLUSION
The work in (Kapratwar et al., 2017) considered both
permissions (i.e., a static feature) and system calls
(i.e., a dynamic feature), and the interplay between
the two. The authors concluded that a slight reduc-
tion in the number of permissions has a significant ef-
fect, and suggested that malware writers may be able
to evade detection by relatively minor modifications
to their code, such as reducing the number of per-
missions requested. Here, we provided a more nu-
anced analysis to show that it is likely to be signif-
icantly more difficult to evade permission-based de-
tection than suggested in (Kapratwar et al., 2017).
Specifically, in this paper we showed that a relatively
small number of permissions can serve as a strong
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Figure 10: Multiclass results
feature vector, even for the more challenging multi-
class problem. These results indicate that eliminat-
ing the specific permissions that comprise the reduced
feature set is likely not an option for most malware.
In addition, we showed that taking the opposite tack,
that is, adding unnecessary permissions that are com-
mon among bening apps, is also of limited value. We
conclude that features based on permissions are likely
to remain a viable option for detecting Android mal-
ware.
Our experimental results also show that malware
detection on an Android device is practical, since the
necessary features can be extracted and scored effi-
ciently. For example, using an ANN on a reduced
feature set, we can obtain an AUC of 0.9920 for the
binary classification problem. And even in the case of
highly skewed data—as would typically be expected
in a realistic scenario—an ANN can attain a testing
accuracy in excess of 96%.
The malware classification problem is inherently
more challenging than the malware detection prob-
lem. But even in this difficult case, we obtained a
testing accuracy of almost 95%, based on a random
forest. It is worth noting that a random forest also per-
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Figure 11: Multiclass results with balanced datasets (testing)
forms well for binary classification, with about 97%
testing accuracy. A random forest requires signifi-
cantly less computing power to train, as compared
to an ANN, and this might be a factor in some im-
plementations, although training is often considered
one-time work.
For future work, it would be interesting to fur-
ther explore deep learning for Android malware de-
tection, based on permissions. For ANNs, there are
many parameters that can be tested, and it is possi-
ble that the ANN results presented in this paper can
be significantly improved upon. As another avenue
for future work, recent research has shown promising
malware detection results by applying image analy-
sis techniques to binary executable files; see, for ex-
ample (Huang et al., 2018; Yajamanam et al., 2018).
As far as the authors are aware, such analysis has not
been applied to the mobile malware detection or clas-
sification problems.
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Figure 12: Random forest confusion matrix as percentages (training)
